Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 60

Number 1

Article 5

5-5-2020

INEQUITABLE OUTCOMES FROM THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
DEFENSE: A PROPOSAL FOR REVISING AN EMPLOYEEINVENTOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Sink, R. Kehl

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sink, R. Kehl, Case Note, INEQUITABLE OUTCOMES FROM THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE: A
PROPOSAL FOR REVISING AN EMPLOYEE-INVENTOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185
(2020).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol60/iss1/5

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

INEQUITABLE OUTCOMES FROM THE INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT DEFENSE: A PROPOSAL FOR REVISING AN
EMPLOYEE-INVENTOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
R. Kehl Sink*
U.S. patent law imposes a mandatory duty of disclosure on inventors named on U.S. patent applications. This duty requires that certain
individuals, including named inventors, disclose to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office any material information of which the individual becomes aware for as long as the patent application is pending. For an
employee-inventor, this obligation may persist after she has assigned her
patent rights to her employer and after she leaves her employment. Failure to comply with this duty can render any resulting patent invalid
through the inequitable conduct defense. This mandatory disclosure obligation is an inefficient use of societal resources and may lead to ironically inequitable results due to lack of regular communication between
corporate patent prosecution groups and former employees or due to
intentional malfeasance by former employees.
The mandatory disclosure rules provided in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 and
the inequitable conduct defense serve the laudable goal of reducing the
fraudulent acquisition of enforceable patents. However, the costs of
these means outweigh the benefits of the ends, particularly in the case of
employee-inventors after termination of their employment. This Note is
not the first to advocate for repeal of the mandatory disclosure rules
altogether for publicly available documents. Many patent practitioners
share the belief that societal resources are not well spent reporting publicly available prior art references. However, repeal of the disclosure
rules for all publicly available references may be politically infeasible.
So, this Note alternatively proposes a more limited revision to the
* Ph.D. Electrical and Computer Engineering Department of the University of California, Santa Barbara, 2000; J.D. Santa Clara University School of Law, 2020; Registered Patent
Agent, 2006. I formerly held the positions of Senior Vice President, Intellectual Property and
Legal at BioPharmX, Inc., and Director, Intellectual Property at Reliant Technologies, Inc. I
would like to thank Brian J. Love, Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the HighTech Law Institute at Santa Clara University School of Law, for his thoughtful suggestions
and Maggie Cockayne, Senior Articles Editor of Santa Clara Law Review Volume 60, for her
detailed review.
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mandatory disclosure rules: The mandatory disclosure obligation
should at a minimum be modified by (1) removing the requirement to
disclose U.S. patents and U.S. published patent applications and (2) limiting the duration of the mandatory disclosure obligation for employeeinventors to the duration of the inventor’s agency relationship with the
corporate employer-assignee. With these changes, the U.S. patent system will more effectively fulfill its constitutional mandate to “promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a small pharmaceutical corporation with a single patent
family1 protecting its flagship product. This patent family protects the
crown jewels of the corporation and without issuance of a valid enforceable U.S. patent, the corporation will fail. If an employee-inventor who
is listed on a pending patent application in this family is fired by the
corporation, the inventor may harbor ill will against the corporation and
certainly will not be motivated to support the corporation. However, the
inventor still retains a duty to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office to
disclose material prior art of which she becomes aware.2 If the former
employee violates this third-party duty, any granted patent resulting
from the original patent application may be rendered worthless,3 thus
unfairly harming the corporation, rather than the former employee.
The Code of Federal Regulations imposes on inventors and other
persons involved in patent prosecution a duty to disclose known information that is material to patentability.4 For each patent application that
names a person as an inventor, this duty persists until a patent is granted
or the patent application is abandoned.5 The obligation may be extended
further if a continuation or divisional patent application is filed.6 Employee-inventors who assign their inventions to an employer are not relieved of this duty by such assignments or by termination of their employment agreements.7

1. A patent family is a group of patents or patent applications that claim a common
priority date based on a common priority application. See, e.g., Talya Poncheck, Does the
Patent System Promote Scientific Innovation? Empirical Analysis of Patent Forward Citations, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 289, 322 (2015).
2. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56(a), (c) (2012). Information is considered material if “it is not
cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application, and
(1) [i]t establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim; or (2) [i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in: (i) [o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the [Patent and Trademark]
Office, or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of patentability.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), (c).
5. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
6. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2001.06(b) (9th ed., rev. 8, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP].
7. See generally Rene D. Tegtmeyer, A Refocusing on Inequitable Conduct in New Rule
56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 202 (1992) (“[T]he duty imposed on [the inventor] continues until
the application issues as a patent or becomes abandoned and does not terminate when they
cease to be substantively involved with the preparation or prosecution of the application.”);
Comment 34 and the Pat. and Trademark Off. Reply in Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg.
2021-02 (Jan. 17, 1992) (“The duty to disclose information material to patentability rests on
the individuals designated in § 1.56(c) until the application issues as a patent or becomes
abandoned.”).
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The remedies for breach of the duty to disclose can be severe. 8 Intentional breach of the duty to disclose is inequitable conduct, and the
remedy for inequitable conduct is that the entire patent or even multiple
related patents are rendered unenforceable.9 Thus, the remedy for inequitable conduct is distinguished from invalidity patent defenses, such as
anticipation and obviousness, which are limited to invalidation of only
the impacted individual claims rather than all claims of a patent.10 For
this reason, Federal Circuit Court Judge Rader has described the inequitable conduct remedy as the “atomic bomb” of patent law.11 A disgruntled inventor who is fired from a corporation can theoretically destroy
the value of one or more of the corporation’s patents by intentionally
breaching her duty of disclosure.12 In other words, in apparent contradiction, the employee-inventor could have an ethical duty to unethically
disclose a confidential trade secret of her new employer.
Even if an employee-inventor terminates employment under good
terms, she may subsequently be employed by a competitor and be exposed to aspects of the competitor’s confidential research that would be
material to patentability of her former employer’s pending patent application. For example, this may occur if the former employee learns of
information that “refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in . . . [o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
[Patent and Trademark] Office.”13 Furthermore, even if the former employee becomes aware of non-confidential information and does not
have significant contact with her former employer, she may not know
whether the patent application is still pending or to whom at her former
employer she should disclose material information.14

8. See, e.g., Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (holding that patents for a global positioning system were unenforceable because
an inventor failed to disclose his knowledge of an owner’s manual and photographs of a car
navigation system even though the asserted claims were otherwise valid and enforceable).
9. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988). See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808-12 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
10. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd., 863 F.2d at 877 (rendering an entire patent unenforceable based on a finding of inequitable conduct); 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2011) (permitting
maintenance of an infringement action based on a valid claim of a patent containing an invalid
claim).
11. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Am. Calcar, Inc., 768 F.3d at 1191-92.
13. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).
14. The average pendency of a U.S. patent application has varied from approximately
1.5 to 3.5 years over the period from 1985 to 2016. See Dennis Crouch, Pendency of US Patent
Applications, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 6, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/pendencypatent-applications.html.

2020] INEQUITABLE OUTCOMES OF INVENTOR’S DISCLOSURE DUTY 189
The Constitution empowers Congress to enact a patent system “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”15 To further this goal
most effectively, Congress should remove the obligation to disclose publicly available information. Furthermore, Congress should change the
disclosure obligation to focus on the patent applicant, rather than “individual[s] associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application.”16 This is particularly important for inventions created in the course
of an inventor’s employment that are assigned or subject to an assignment obligation to the inventor’s employer. For employee-assigned inventions, the true party in interest in the patent prosecution is the corporate applicant, not the inventor. The continued focus of the U.S. patent
regulations on the inventor instead of the applicant can lead to perverse
outcomes and is an inefficient use of societal resources.
Other countries have taken significantly different approaches to disclosure requirements.17 Australia instituted disclosure requirements but
abandoned these requirements altogether in 2007 for newly-filed applications.18 The European Patent Office, Korea, and China have not
adopted a duty to disclose prior art.19 Canada, Israel, India, and Japan
have adopted disclosure requirements but the obligation falls on the patent applicant, rather than the inventor.20
With the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (the “AIA”),
the United States has taken several steps towards harmonizing its patent
system with those of other countries.21 These steps include adopting a
first-inventor-to-file system and recognizing the right of non-inventor
applicants to file a patent application for an assigned invention.22 However, the AIA did not remove the duty of inventors to disclose information material to patentability or reduce the draconian penalties

15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
17. See Gina M. Bicknell, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Duty of Candor Obligations
of the United States and Foreign Patent Offices, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 456-63 (2008).
18. See id. at 458-59.
19. Id. at 460; Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits
of Disclosure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 356 (2011); Manxia Xu, China: Patents 2020,
ICLG.COM § 5.2 (Sept. 15, 2019), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/patents-laws-and-regulations/china.
20. Bicknell, supra note 17, at 456, 458-63.
21. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C.), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20110916-pub-l112-29.pdf.
22. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Revises U.S. Patent Law Regime, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1290, 1291-92 (Mar. 20, 2012), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol125_leahy_smith_america_invents_act.pdf [hereinafter AIA Revises U.S. Patent Law].
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associated with breach of this duty.23 This Note argues that the duty of
disclosure mandated by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56,24 coupled with the “atomic
bomb” defense of inequitable conduct for breach of this duty,25 does not
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”26 This Note describes the development of the inequitable conduct defense starting from
its roots in the doctrine of unclean hands and concluding with recent
clarifications to the doctrine by the Therasense court. Based on this understanding of the U.S. duty of disclosure, this Note compares the U.S.
system to those of several other countries. The effects of these differences are assessed and alternate approaches are recommended for the
U.S. system. The obligation to disclose art that is material to patentability should be removed for publicly available references. This disclosure
duty not only fails to use societal resources efficiently, it is not necessary
to an efficient and effective patent system. Alternatively, the obligation
to disclose should be modified in two ways. First, the duty to disclose
should not require disclosure of U.S. patents and published U.S. patent
applications since these are easily accessible and searchable for patent
examiners. Second, to reduce the impact on corporate patentees following the termination of employment for employee-inventors’ patent applications prosecuted by an employer-assignee applicant, rather than an
employee-inventor, the inventor’s obligation to disclose material information should terminate when the agency relationship between the employer-assignee and the employee-inventor ends.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the inequitable conduct doctrine from the unclean
hands doctrine
In the 1800s and early 1900s, the Supreme Court did not recognize
extrinsic misconduct by the patentee as an invalidity defense to patent
infringement.27 Patent fraud required, as for common law fraud, reliance
and proximate damage to the injured party. 28 Furthermore, in patent
fraud cases, the injured party was deemed to be the government, not an
23. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. See, e.g., Am. Calcar, Inc., 768 F.3d at 1192; Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
24. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
25. Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1349.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
27. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 38–51 (1993).
28. Id. at 38-39.
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accused infringer, which meant that patent fraud was not a defense to a
claim of patent infringement.29 In Mowry v. Whitney,30 for example, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of an equitable defense of fraud, noting that
only the government had standing to invalidate a patent for fraud since
the government was the injured party.31 Fraud allegations by individuals
were limited to situations of conflicting patents32 or to cases where fraud
“appear[ed] on the face of the patent.”33 In Corona Cord Tire Co.,34 the
Court held that patents were presumed valid even if false statements
were made to the patent examiner to procure allowance so long as the
false statements were not “indispensable to the granting of the patent.”35
In the 1930s and 1940s, however, the public grew hostile to patent
monopolies and the Supreme Court formulated a new doctrine based on
the principle of unclean hands.36 In Keystone Driller,37 the Court recognized the unclean hands doctrine in patent cases in which “unconscionable act[s]” had an “immediate and necessary relation” to the equitable
relief sought in litigation.38 In Keystone Driller, the Court found the patentee to have unclean hands due to information suppressed during a
prior trial of the same patent, not due to the fraudulent statements made
during patent prosecution.39

29. See id. at 41-42.
30. 81 U.S. 434 (1871).
31. Id. at 441 (“The fraud, if one exists, has been practiced on the government, and as
the party injured, it is the appropriate party to assert the remedy or seek relief.”).
32. See id. at 439-41. “[N]o one but the government . . . can institute judicial proceedings
for the purpose of vacating or rescinding the patent which the government has issued to an
individual, except in the cases provided for in section sixteen [regarding conflicting patent
claims] of the act of July 4th, 1836.” Id. at 439.
33. Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 797 (1869) (“Unless letters patent
are absolutely void on the face of them, or the issuing of them was without authority, or was
prohibited by statute, they can only be avoided in a regular course of pleading, in which the
fraud, irregularity, or mistake is regularly put in issue. The principle has been frequently admitted, that the fraud must appear on the face of the patent to render it void in a court of law,
and that when the fraud or other defect arises on circumstances, dehors the grant, the grant is
voidable only by suit.” (quoting Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns. 23, 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813)).
34. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
35. Id. at 374 (finding that affidavits that falsely stated actual reduction to practice predating a prior art publication were “perhaps reckless” but not material because they were not
“indispensable to the granting of the patent” and therefore could not overcome the presumption of validity of the granted patent).
36. Goldman, supra note 27, at 39.
37. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
38. Id. at 245 (“[Courts] apply the maxim requiring clean hands only where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that
he seeks in respect of the matter in litigation.”).
39. Id. at 247.
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A decade later, the Court faced another egregious case of patentee
malfeasance in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.40 The patentee committed fraud
on the Patent Office by (1) paying an expert to write a paper that described the claimed invention as groundbreaking and (2) representing to
the examiner that this paper was an independent publication to secure
allowance of the patent application.41 The patentee also committed fraud
on the courts by suppressing evidence during trial that would connect the
patentee to the paid expert author.42 As a result of the patentee’s fraud
on both the Patent Office and the courts, the Court held that the patent
owner’s fraud was grounds for “complete denial of relief.”43 Thus, the
Court no longer required the government be a party to a suit for a patent
to be found unenforceable.44
In 1945, the Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. Court more formally
crafted the inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement.45 The
Court relied upon the common law doctrine of unclean hands and found
that fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent Office alone was sufficient to render a patent unenforceable.46
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who
are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising
duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. . . . Public interest demands
that all facts relevant to such matters be submitted formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to safeguard
the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent monopolies.
Only in that way can the Patent Office and the public escape from
being classed among the ‘mute and helpless victims of deception and
fraud.’47

The 1952 Patent Act significantly revised the U.S. patent system.48
This Act remains the foundation of the contemporary U.S. patent

40. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), departed from
on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976).
41. See id. at 240-42.
42. See id. at 241-43.
43. Id. at 250.
44. Id.; Goldman, supra note 27, at 48.
45. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814
(1945) (“It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted
with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.”).
46. Id. at 814-16.
47. Id. at 818 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246) (internal citations omitted).
48. See Matt Kwong, Six Significant Moments in Patent History, REUTERS (Nov. 4,
2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moments-patent/six-significant-moments-in-
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system.49 The 1952 Act did not adopt any specific language regarding
an inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement, electing only to
note that “unenforceability” was a defense to patent infringement.50 Instead, it incorporated the concept that patents were presumed valid, as
described in Corona Cord Tire Co.51 The Patent Office’s Rules of Practice in Patent Cases of 1949 and the corresponding federal regulations
prohibited fraud but did not specifically address inequitable conduct and
did not further elucidate a definition of inequitable conduct.52 So, even
with the judicially developed doctrine of Keystone Driller, Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co., and Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., statutory changes were
slow to follow.53
Over the next few decades, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuits
further developed a duty of disclosure.54 In 1977, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (the “PTO”) adopted much of this case law to more
precisely define the duty of disclosure.55 Section 1.56 provided that inventors, prosecuting patent agents and attorneys, and those who are
“substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application” have a duty “of candor and good faith” to disclose known information that is material to examination.56 The PTO clarified that “the
duty applies only to individuals, not to organizations.”57 The PTO also
clarified the scope of the duty by adopting a reasonable examiner

patent-history-idUSKBN0IN1Y120141104 (describing how the Patent Act of 1952 was a major reform of America’s first Patent Act).
49. See David O. Taylor, Patent Fraud, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 94 (2010).
50. Goldman, supra note 27, at 52-53.
51. Taylor, supra note 49, at 88-89.
52. Goldman, supra note 27, at 53 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1951)).
53. See Goldman, supra note 27, at 52-53.
54. See id. at 57-61.
55. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
56. Id. at 5593.
“A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application
and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or
prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All
such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of
which is material to the examination of the application. Such information is material
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty
is commensurate with the degree of involvement in the preparation or prosecution
of the application.”
Id.
57. Id. at 5589.
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standard for materiality.58 Furthermore, the 1977 regulation defined the
level of proof needed to demonstrate breach of the duty. To invalidate
an application for inequitable conduct, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(d) required
demonstration by “clear and convincing evidence” that the duty of disclosure had been violated “through bad faith or gross negligence.”59 In
response to the low gross negligence standard , defendants in patent infringement cases asserted the inequitable conduct defense in nearly
every suit.60 Courts soon recognized that this defense had become an
“absolute plague” on the patent system.61 The Federal Circuit’s solution
at the appellate level was to change the standard of review of district
courts’ factual findings for materiality and intent from de novo to clearly
erroneous or abuse of discretion.62 This ultimately proved to be an insufficient band-aid.63 The Therasense decision followed.64
In 2011, in response to continued burdens on the PTO and the courts
“to the detriment of the public,” the Federal Circuit in Therasense sought
to rein in the excesses of the inequitable conduct defense and other undesirable unintended consequences.65 Notably, the court declined to follow 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 when defining inequitable conduct because the rule
was overly broad and the court found this breadth caused many of the
problems with the inequitable conduct defense.66 “Because Rule 56 sets
such a low bar for materiality, adopting this standard would inevitably
result in patent prosecutors continuing the existing practice of disclosing
too much prior art of marginal relevance and patent litigators continuing

58. Id. (“Information is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as
a patent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. Id. at 5594. “An application shall be stricken from the files if it is established by clear
and convincing evidence that any fraud was practiced or attempted on the Office in connection
with it or that there was any violation of the duty of disclosure through bad faith or gross
negligence.” Id.
60. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“Inequitable conduct . . . should not be[] a magic incantation to be asserted against every
patentee.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become
an absolute plague.”).
62. See FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1414 (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd., 863 F.2d at 876 (reviewing under abuse of discretion
standard).
63. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1285 (“Recognizing the problems created by the
expansion and overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine, this court granted Abbott’s petition
for rehearing en banc.”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1289-90.
66. Id. at 1294-95.
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to charge inequitable conduct in nearly every case as a litigation strategy.”67
The inequitable conduct defense is a judicially created defense
based on the doctrine of unclean hands but has characteristics that distinguish it from the general unclean hands defense.68 The scope of the
inequitable conduct defense has expanded relative to the unclean hands
defense to cover “not only egregious affirmative acts of misconduct intended to deceive both the PTO and the courts but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO.”69 In contrast, the Supreme Court’s
unclean hands cases of Keystone Driller, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., and
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. were each based on particularly egregious
cases in which the patent owner “deliberately planned and carefully executed schemes to defraud” both the PTO and the courts.70 The spirit of
the unclean hands defense as addressed by these cases has been retained
as part of the inequitable conduct defense.71 Since “affirmative egregious misconduct” (e.g., “filing of an unmistakably false affidavit” during prosecution) is inherently material, but-for materiality is not required
in such cases.72 In addition, the unclean hands defense remains simultaneously in effect for acts of business and litigation misconduct.73 Inequitable conduct permits a court to render an entire patent unenforceable
generally, rather than merely permitting dismissal of the suit against a
particular plaintiff, which is the remedy for a successful unclean hands
defense.74
Therasense clarified the elements of intent and materiality and defined the appropriate tests for evaluation of a patentee’s allegedly inequitable conduct.75 First, Therasense emphasized that intent and materiality are independent elements of the inequitable conduct defense and
are not evaluated on a sliding scale.76 This abrogated Am. Hoist &
67. Id. at 1295 (referring to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
68. Id. at 1287.
69. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
70. Id. (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 245).
71. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d. 1357, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (“Just as it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his patent through
deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of material information to enforce the patent
against others, it is also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the patentee committed only minor missteps or acted with minimal culpability.”).
72. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292.
73. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (applying
the unclean hands standard from Keystone Driller to business and litigation misconduct and
distinguishing such conduct from inequitable conduct because the unclean hands did not result
from communications with the PTO).
74. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287; Gilead Scis., Inc., 888 F.3d at 1233-34.
75. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290-91.
76. Id. at 1290.
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Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., which had defined a sliding scale such
that higher levels of materiality require lower levels of intent.77 Second,
the Federal Circuit tightened the standards for proving intent and clarified the corresponding evidence standard and the types of evidence that
can be used.78 Gross negligence is no longer sufficient.79 Instead, “specific intent to deceive the PTO” is required.80 “[T]he accused infringer
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of
the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision
to withhold it.”81 The court recognized that direct evidence of intent may
frequently be unavailable and therefore held that courts “may infer intent
from indirect and circumstantial evidence. However, . . . the specific intent to deceive must be the single most reasonable inference able to be
drawn from the evidence.”82 Third, Therasense clarified that materiality
is assessed using a but-for test: if the PTO would not have allowed a
claim but for the withholding of the undisclosed reference, then the withheld reference is material.83 Finally, the court clarified the balancing test
used to prove inequitable conduct.84 Once intent and materiality are
proven, the “court . . . weigh[s] the equities to determine whether the
applicant’s conduct before the PTO warrants rendering the entire patent
unenforceable.”85 Thus, Therasense provided much needed clarity regarding the requirements for the inequitable conduct defense and scaled
back what it saw as the excesses of the defense.86
Also in 2011, Congress passed the AIA, which was heralded as the
most significant reform of the patent system since 1952.87 The AIA

77. Id.; see also Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
78. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290-91.
79. Id. at 1290.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1290-91 (“[W]hen
there are multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be
found.”).
83. Id. at 1291-92. Note that invalidity is sufficient but not necessary to demonstrate
materiality. Information that invalidates a claim is inherently material. However, information
may be material even if it does not invalidate a patent claim. An example of the difference
between these tests is apparent in the different evidentiary standards required by the U.S. PTO
and federal courts: Invalidation of a granted patent requires demonstration by clear and convincing evidence, whereas materiality requires demonstration only by preponderance of the
evidence. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1291-92.
84. See id. at 1287.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1289-95.
87. David Goldman, Patent Reform is Finally on its Way, CNN MONEY (June 24, 2011),
https://money.cnn.com/2011/06/24/technology/patent_reform_bill/index.htm.
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partially harmonized the U.S. rules with those of other countries.88 The
AIA adopted a number of changes, including among others: (1) switching to a first-inventor-to-file system from a first-to-invent system, (2)
creating and adapting post-grant opposition procedures, and (3) allowing
filing of patent applications by applicants other than inventors.89 In the
United States, the change to permit applicants to file applications on behalf of inventors became effective on September 16, 2012, thus recognizing applicants as the true party in interest for patent applications.90
For applications filed before that date, an assignee can prosecute an application, but the inventor is still viewed as the applicant.91 For applications filed on or after the effective date, an assignee or a person to whom
the inventor is obligated to assign an invention may file and prosecute
the application as the applicant.92 Although the AIA did not significantly
change the duty of disclosure, the PTO added the applicant and those
associated with the applicant to the list of those responsible for disclosing material information to the PTO.93 This change was necessary for
consistency with the AIA’s change to allow assignee-applicants to file
patent applications.94 However, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 was not changed to
remove inventors from the list of those required to disclose material information to the PTO.95 So, unlike in most other countries,96 for an applicant-filed patent application in the United States, the inventor still has
an explicit duty to disclose material information to the PTO.97
B. Inequitable conduct and disclosure rules outside the United States
The United States is the only country to use inequitable conduct as
an incentive for disclosure.98 As described in more detail below, several
88. AIA Revises U.S. Patent Law, supra note 22.
89. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 21; AIA Revises U.S. Patent Law, supra note 22.
90. MPEP, supra note 6, at § 605.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(3). The list of individuals defined as “associated with the
filing or prosecution of a patent application” is expanded to include “[e]very other person who
is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application[s] and who is
associated with … the applicant.” Id. See also Changes to Implement the Inventor’s Oath or
Declaration Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 48776-01
(Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
94. Changes to Implement the Inventor’s Oath or Declaration Provisions of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48776, 48788, 48818.
95. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(1).
96. See infra section II.B.
97. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(1).
98. Honorable Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Foreword: Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 781 (2010).
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other countries have disclosure obligations but they differ in their approaches as to whether and when inventors have a disclosure obligation.
These countries also have different approaches to address noncompliance with the disclosure obligation.
1. Japan: Disclosure Obligation for Applicant
A prior art disclosure obligation is still relatively new to the Japanese Patent Office (the “JPO”), which only incorporated a disclosure obligation into its patent system in 2002.99 In Japan, (1) the disclosure obligation is limited to information known by the applicant at the time of
filing, (2) the applicant, not the inventor, has an obligation to disclose,
and (3) non-compliance does not affect the validity of an issued patent.100
An applicant is not required to conduct a prior art search.101 However, a
“person desiring a patent ([i.e., the] applicant for patent)”102 has a duty
to disclose prior art known as of the filing date.103 Prior art under Japanese law is defined as “any inventions publicly made known through
documents . . . which are related to the invention for which a patent is
sought.”104 To determine whether an earlier document is “related” to the
invention, the courts consider the similarity between the prior art and the
claimed invention with regards to their fields, problems solved, and
99. Following the United States, Japan and Australia Enact Duty to Disclose Requirements, https://web.archive.org/web/20080605232032/http://www.gastle.com/bulletin5.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2019); see also JAPANESE PAT. OFF., EXAMINATION GUIDELINES ON
REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON PRIOR ART DOCUMENTS 1,
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/news/public/feedback/document/prior_art_doc/prior_art_doc.pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter JPO Examination Guidelines].
100. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 1-2 (quoting [Japanese] Patent Law
§ 36(4)(ii)) (“Where a person desiring a patent knows, at the time of filing a patent application,
any inventions publicly known through documents (inventions referred to in Section
29(1)(iii); the same meaning shall apply thereunder in this paragraph) which are related to the
invention, the detailed description of the invention shall contain the source of information on
the invention publicly known through a document such as the title of a publication in which
the invention publicly known through a document is described.”).
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Keisen’s Policy on the IDS System in Japan, KEISEN ASSOCIATES, http://www.keisenassociates.com/IP%20News%20Flash-%20IDS.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2019); see also
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 7. Disclosure obligation is limited to prior art
known as of the filing date. The filing date is defined as the filing date of (1) the parent
application for a divisional or converted application, (2) the priority application with the latest
filing date for a Japanese domestic application or a national phase application claiming priority under the PCT (i.e., an “international patent application”), and (3) the Japanese application
for an application claiming priority under the Paris Convention. See id.; Japanese Patent
FAQs, ONDA TECHNO INT’L PAT. ATTYS, https://www.ondatechno.com/English/ip/patent/faq_prior.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). The JPO requires submission of at least one
reference for non-PCT applications. Id.
104. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 1-2. Invention refers to the claimed
invention. Id. at 4.
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inventive aspects.105 If there are no related prior art documents, the applicant is required to submit documents that generally describe the state
of the art in the technical field of the invention.106 The applicant also has
a statutory obligation to list at least one prior art reference in the background section of a patent application or provide an explanation for the
lack of this reference. 107
The focus in the Japanese system is on the applicant, rather than the
inventor.108 If an applicant is a corporation, the Japanese Examination
Guidelines explicitly note that the applicant is deemed to know of (1)
patent applications filed by the corporation, (2) prior art “obtained
through prior art research” by employees of the corporation “in the
course of their duties,” and (3) publications by employees of the company in the name of the company.109 Thus, the standard for who must
disclose and what must be disclosed differs from the U.S. approach. In
addition, since the applicant’s duty to disclose ends at the filing date, the
likelihood that an inventor has left the company before the end of the
disclosure obligation is significantly reduced relative to the U.S. system
where the duty to disclose extends through the grant of the patent.110
The enforcement mechanisms in the Japanese system also differ
from those of the U.S. system. In contrast to the “atomic bomb” of the
inequitable conduct in U.S. jurisprudence,111 failure to disclose known
prior art in Japan may result in rejection of patent claims by the patent
examiner under Section 49(v) of the Japanese Patent Law, but such a
failure has no effect on validity of a granted patent.112 The penalty of
invalidity is not imposed for a granted patent because the disclosure rule
is designed to improve efficiency of the patent office and it is recognized
that failure to disclose does not seriously harm third-party infringers.113
The purpose of the disclosure obligation is solely to assist the examiner
in understanding the technical significance, the technical contribution,
and the patentability of the disclosed invention.114 In place of the stick
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 5.
107. KEISEN ASSOCIATES, supra note 103.
108. See JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 1-2 (generally discussing the Japanese patent system in the context of the applicant’s knowledge and duties to disclose).
109. JAPANESE PAT. OFF., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING THE EXAMINATION
GUIDELINES ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON PRIOR ART
DOCUMENTS AND MAJOR CHANGES TO THE GUIDELINES 4, http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/pdf/prior_art_faq.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
110. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 with JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 6.
111. Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1349.
112. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2; see also KEISEN ASSOCIATES, supra note 103.
113. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2.
114. See id.
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of invalidity used in the U.S. system, the Japanese system provides a
carrot: the JPO encourages disclosure by suggesting that disclosure allows the examiner to consider the prior art and thus can result in a
stronger patent right if the patent is granted.115
In addition to the lack of an invalidation penalty for an issued patent, an examiner’s rejection of an application for failure to disclose prior
art is also procedurally more difficult in Japan than in the United States.
In Japan, before rejecting claims of an application due to a failure to
disclose prior art, the examiner must notify the applicant that she believes the applicant has not satisfied the disclosure requirement and give
the applicant thirty days for domestic applicants or sixty days for foreign
applicants to provide such disclosures.116
2. Europe, China, and Republic of Korea: No Disclosure
Obligation
Unlike the U.S. and Japanese systems, the European Patent Office
(the “EPO”), the Korean Intellectual Property Office (the “KIPO”), and
the National Intellectual Property Administration of the People’s Republic of China (the “CNIPA”) impose no obligation to disclose prior art or
a duty of candor.117
In Europe, for example, applicants may voluntarily disclose prior
art and many do so to strengthen patent rights prior to post-grant opposition proceedings.118 However, in contrast to the U.S. system, the examiner may choose to disregard prior art cited by the applicant or other
parties.119 This can reduce distraction and allow the examiner time to
focus on an independent search.120 If a patent is ultimately granted, a

115. See id. at 1-2.
116. Id. at 11-13. Patent rights are potentially stronger because the patent applicant may
revise patent claims during prosecution in response to arguments from patent examiner based
on cited art. See id. at 12. Claims revised in response to prior art would be less vulnerable to
invalidation based on the cited prior art.
117. Bicknell, supra note 17, at 460; Erstling, supra note 19, at 356; Xu, supra note 19.
118. Bicknell, supra note 17, at 460 n.194.
119. EUROPEAN PAT. OFF., CONVENTION ON THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS, Part
VII,
Ch.
I,
Art.
114(1),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/029F2DA107DD667FC125825F005311DA/$File/EPC_16th_edition_2016
_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
120. See generally Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent
Systems 20-21 (European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics,
ECARES
Working
Paper
No.
2010-027,
July
2010),
https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-88986.html (noting that an applicant may hide relevant references in a long list of irrelevant references and that reference lists from third parties
are not as helpful to building the examiner’s knowledge of the scope of the prior art when
compared to personally performing a search); Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable
Conduct and Walker Process Claims After Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PA.
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nine-month opposition period follows issuance and during this period
the EPO allows third parties to submit references or “observations concerning the patentability of the invention.”121 Thus, the EPO views opposition as a tool for protecting the public from inappropriate patents.122
Historically, the United States lacked such a robust post-grant opposition
period, but this has been partially addressed by post-grant proceedings
provided in the AIA.123 This historical lack of a strong U.S. post-grant
opposition process had been one of the key arguments that proponents
of the U.S. disclosure duty made for retaining the duty of disclosure.124
3. Canada, Mexico, and India: Limited Disclosure Obligations for
Applicants
The patent offices in Canada and Mexico have adopted intermediate positions between the statutory mandatory disclosure obligations (as
required by the U.S. and Japanese systems) and the lack of disclosure
obligations (as found in the European, Korean, and Chinese systems).125
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office and the Mexican Institute of
Industrial Property allow applicants to disclose prior art for consideration, as in the European system, but also empower patent examiners to
demand applicants to disclose certain prior art.126 Canadian examiners
may demand that applicants disclose all prior art cited against corresponding foreign applications and request details regarding any

J. BUS. L. 361, n.74 (2014) (“[P]atent applicants [attempt] to ‘bury’ examiners with hundreds
of references so as to distract them from highly relevant references.”).
121. EUROPEAN PAT. OFF., supra note 119, at Part V, Ch. I, Art. 99 & Part VII, Ch. I, Art.
115.
122. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They
Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 93, 99 (2012).
123. See Bicknell, supra note 17, at 466-67.
124. See id.
125. Erstling, supra note 19, at 356.
126. Id.
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opposition proceedings.127 However, as in the Japanese system, violation of this disclosure obligation cannot be used to challenge a granted
patent.128
India has a mandatory disclosure requirement but this requirement
is more limited than that required in the U.S. and Japanese systems. Applicants for Indian patents are obligated to disclose information related
to prosecution of corresponding foreign applications, such as any claim
amendments or novelty objections.129 Violation of this obligation can
lead to invalidation of a resulting patent through pre-grant opposition,
post-grant opposition, or litigation.130
4. Australia: Disclosure Obligation Removed
As can be seen by the comparison of the disclosure requirements
for the U.S., Japan, Europe, Korea, China, Mexico, and Canada, there is
not a global consensus regarding the optimal approach to disclosure of
prior art. Australia’s brief experiment with a disclosure requirement provides an example of yet another approach. In 2002, the Commonwealth
Parliament of Australia amended the Patents Act to require disclosure of
patentability searches performed by or on behalf of an applicant in any
country for all applications under examination.131 An applicant was required to disclose such searches if performed or received by the applicant or the applicant’s representative prior to patent issuance.132 The
127. CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF., GOV’T OF CANADA, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE
PRACTICE (MOPOP) § 12.04.01 (Oct. 2019), https://manuels-manuals.opiccipo.gc.ca/w/ic/MOPOP-en#!fragment/zoupio_Toc21981080/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYBGATgA4uABj6CAlABpk2UoQgBFRIVwBPaAHI14iHFzYANnoDCSNNACEyLYTC4ECpao1WbCAMp5SAIVUAlAKIAMn4AagCCAHKGfuKkYABG0KTsoqJAA (“Section 85 of the Patent Rules provides that where an
examiner ‘has reasonable grounds to believe that an application for a patent disclosing the
same invention has been filed, in or for any country other than Canada, by an inventor of that
invention or a person claiming through them’, the examiner may by notice requisition the
applicant to provide any of the following information, a copy of any related document and/or
a translation into English or French of all or part of any related document not in one of those
languages: a. an identification of any prior art cited in respect of the foreign application; b.
the foreign application numbers, filing dates and, if granted, the patent numbers; and c. particulars of, any opposition, re-examination, impeachment or similar proceedings.”); see also
Anthony Prenol & Brett Slaney, Canada: Patents 2020, ICLG. COM § 5.2 (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/patents-laws-and-regulations/canada.
128. Prenol & Slaney, supra note 127; JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2.
129. Erstling, supra note 19, at 356-57; see generally Manish Kumar, India: Information
Disclosure of Foreign Applications, MONDAQ ADVICE CTR. (Aug. 14, 2019),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/836654/Patent/Information+Disclosure+Of+Foreign+Applications.
130. Kumar, supra note 129.
131. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99; Erstling, supra note 19, at 352.
132. JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99.
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Australian obligation was absolute; it did not depend on the materiality
of the search results.133 In addition, as in the United States, the penalties
for noncompliance were significant: “The penalty for failure to comply
was removal of the patentee’s ability to amend a granted patent to avoid
a novelty- or obviousness-type objection based on prior art of the sort
that should have been disclosed.”134
In 2007, the Australian Parliament again amended the Patents Act
to abandon the duty to disclose for all applications for which examination had not been requested prior to October 22, 2007.135 IP Australia,
the Australian administrative equivalent to the PTO, noted that consensus comments indicated that the “existing search result disclosure provisions were onerous and costly for applicants” and that doubts were raised
regarding the value or benefits of the disclosure requirements.136 Formally, however, IP Australia noted that the primary motivation for the
change was improved electronic availability of patent search reports
from patent offices in other countries.137 Regardless of its motivations,
the Australian Parliament ultimately decided that a disclosure obligation
was unnecessary for the effective and efficient review of patent applications.138
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The high-level comparison of the disclosure requirements presented in the previous section illustrates the lack of global consensus regarding the optimal approach to prior art disclosure obligations. This
Note explores the questions of whether the U.S. requirement for mandatory disclosure of known material information is an efficient and effective use of societal resources generally and whether these requirements
impose additional burdens in the context of the employee-inventor and
corporate-applicant.
This Note asserts that the U.S. patent system’s disclosure obligation
(as currently embodied by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56)139 and the inequitable

133. Bicknell, supra note 17, at 458-59.
134. Erstling, supra note 19, at 352.
135. IP AUSTRALIA, CHANGES TO REGULATIONS MADE UNDER SECTIONS 27(1), 45(3)
AND 101D OF THE PATENTS ACT 1990, at § 1.2.1 (Oct. 18, 2007).
136. Donald Zuhn, IP Australia Lifts Requirement to Submit Documentary Searches,
PATENT DOCS (Oct. 25, 2007), https://www.patentdocs.org/2007/10/ip-australia-li.html (describing feedback IP Australia received in response to its position paper dated May 16, 2007).
137. Erstling, supra note 19, at 353 (citing AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IP AUSTRALIA,
CONSULTATION PAPER: REMOVAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO LODGE SEARCH RESULTS UNDER
SUBSECTION 45(3) AND SECTION 101D OF PATENTS ACT 1990 2 (May 2007)).
138. Erstling, supra note 19, at 353.
139. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
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conduct defense (as concretely defined by Therasense)140 do not further
Congress’s constitutional mandate to promote progress in science and
the useful arts. Instead, the requirements overly burden inventors, patent
practitioners, patent examiners, patent applicants, and the courts while
simultaneously not fully preventing fraudulent procurement of patents.
Furthermore, the imposition of a mandatory disclosure duty on inventors, rather than applicants, creates additional burdens and introduces
uncertainty for corporate patent applicants that own patent applications
that name former employees as inventors.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mandatory disclosure obligations under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 fail to
effectively and efficiently use societal resources to promote consistent
outcomes for patentees
An inherent tension exists between the societal benefits of inventors
teaching their inventions to the public and the societal costs of providing
a limited monopoly to patentees.141 This tension is apparent when considering optimization of rules for mandatory disclosure. On one hand,
the fair award of patents to worthy inventors has promoted progress in
science and the useful arts,142 and an excessively burdensome patent system may discourage potential patent applicants. Furthermore, a patent
is a significant public sacrifice that should be only be granted if the invention taught by the inventor is worthy of a government-granted monopoly.143 Mandatory disclosure requirements and the inequitable conduct defense are designed to protect the public against the award of
patents sought with fraudulent means. However, imposition of disclosure duties should not be so burdensome that their societal costs outweigh their benefits.
To simultaneously encourage inventors to publicly teach their inventions and prevent granting of fraudulent patents, a patent system can
promote progress of science and the useful arts by effectively and
140. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1285-95.
141. See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., 1905), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Jefferson].
142. Erik S. Maurer, An Economic Justification for A Broad Interpretation of Patentable
Subject Matter, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (2001) (“Economists now generally accept
that, in one form or another, the ‘missing element’ of our nation’s economic growth is the
intangible product of knowledge and innovation.”).
143. Jefferson, supra note 141. (“Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not
of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line
between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,
and those which are not.”).
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efficiently making the most relevant prior art available to patent examiners. Requiring mandatory disclosure of material information arguably
is neither effective nor efficient. First, the current disclosure rule is excessively burdensome and is not an efficient use of society’s resources
when viewed holistically. Second, the lack of adoption of similar regulations by other countries indicates that the U.S. disclosure rule is not
necessary to an effective patent process and may be detrimental.
1. The mandatory disclosure requirement and “atomic bomb” of
the inequitable conduct defense inefficiently burden
society, with particular burdens placed on courts,
examiners, and applicants
The mandatory disclosure requirement and the “atomic bomb” of
the inequitable conduct defense are not efficient uses of societal resources.144 This combination burdens courts, examiners, and applicants.145 Furthermore, the burdens are allocated (ironically) inequitably:
the disclosure obligations of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 create traps for the innocent unwary inventor and corporate patent applicant while Therasense
simultaneously provides a “roadmap” for the devious knowledgeable patentee to avoid such pitfalls.146 These effects burden innovation by increasing uncertainty in the patent system and by increasing costs for patent prosecution and litigation.
First, courts are burdened by the additional time spent addressing a
typically unsuccessful or unnecessary patent defense.147 The attractiveness of invalidating an entire patent, rather than just a single claim, and
the potential for expansion of discovery have strong allure to defendants.148 So, inequitable conduct is a frequent defense to patent infringement, which puts a large burden on the courts, or an “absolute plague”
in the words of Federal Circuit Court Judge Nichols.149 The severity of

144. See Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1349.
145. See id. at 1349-50 (explaining that “[t]he allegation of inequitable conduct opens new
avenues of discovery; impugns the integrity of the patentee, its counsel, and the patent itself;
excludes the prosecuting attorney from trial participation . . . ; and even offers the trial court
a way to dispose of a case without the rigors of claim construction and other complex patent
doctrines”) (Rader, J., dissenting).
146. Mark & Anenson, supra note 120, at 385 (arguing that the rigid Therasense requirements “create a roadmap to success for dishonest patent applicants and thus encourage misconduct”).
147. Lee Petherbridge, et al., Unenforceability, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1751, 1754-55
(2013); see also Eric E. Johnson, The Case for Eliminating Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Defense, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2017).
148. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287-88.
149. Burlington Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1422 (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable
conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
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the “atomic bomb” of patent invalidation as a remedy for breach of the
duty of disclosure incentivizes accused infringers to burden the courts
by excessively raising this defense.150 One study found that 21-40% of
Answers in patent infringement cases from 2000 to 2014 included a reference to inequitable conduct.151 However, the inequitable conduct defense is rarely successful. A separate study found that only ninety-five
patents had been successfully rendered unenforceable with this defense
for the thirty-five-year period from 1976 to 2010.152 Other studies have
found that the success rate for the defense is 9% post-Therasense and the
success rate for cases appealed to the Federal Circuit and arguing the
defense is approximately 20%.153
Even when the defense is successful, the ruling is frequently accompanied by a finding that at least some claims of the patent are invalid.154 In nearly half of cases where courts found inequitable conduct,
they also ruled upon validity and 89% of those cases also held the patent
to be invalid.155 This has led some to argue that the inequitable conduct
defense is redundant with invalidity defense.156 This correlation does
not render the inequitable conduct defense wholly redundant, however.
A successful invalidity defense only renders an individual claim unenforceable whereas a successful inequitable conduct defense renders invalid an entire patent or even an entire family of patents.157 Importantly
though, the significant correlation between these defenses reduces the
benefit of the inequitable conduct defense in protecting society from the
effects of fraudulently obtained patents. Thus, the current U.S. disclosure and enforcement approach provides a low percentage of successful
inequitable conduct defenses and a relatively strong correlation between
successful inequitable conduct defenses and successful invalidity defenses. These observations raise the question of whether the deterrent
150. Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1349-50.
151. Jason Rantanen & Lee Pethrebridge, Inequitable Conduct and Patent Misuse, 16-09
U. OF IOWA, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 1, 18-19 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter Rantanen
& Pethrebridge, Inequitable Conduct].
152. Petherbridge et al., supra note 147, at 1762.
153. Rantanen & Pethrebridge, Inequitable Conduct, supra note 151, at 23-25 (citing a
study that found the post-Therasense success rate through April 10, 2013 was 9% (6/64) in
district courts and three studies reporting success rates of 21%, 22%, and 22% at the Federal
Circuit).
154. Rantanen & Pethrebridge, Inequitable Conduct, supra note 151, at 12.
155. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combatting the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 163 (2005) (finding that in cases where inequitable conduct is successfully argued, the courts simultaneously evaluated invalidity in approximately half of those cases and held at least some claims to be invalid in 89% of such
cases).
156. Rantanen & Pethrebridge, Inequitable Conduct, supra note 151, at 12.
157. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292.
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effects of these policies are necessary to limit inequitable conduct. In
other words, is the sole reason that the inequitable defense is typically
unsuccessful because of the strong deterrent effects of the U.S. mandatory disclosure requirement and the inequitable conduct defense? This
question will be addressed in the next section.158
The burden of the inequitable conduct defense is not limited to the
courts. In addition, patent examiners are burdened by a requirement that
they review all cited art.159 In 2012, the average number of references
cited per application was forty-three.160 However, eight percent of patent
applications had more than 100 references cited, and that percentage had
nearly tripled relative to the number only five years earlier.161 Despite
these significant numbers of cited references, “patent examiners rarely
use applicant-submitted art in their rejections to narrow patents, relying
almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves.”162 For comparison, Japan also has a disclosure requirement, but Japan’s lesser penalty
for failure to disclose reduces the incentive for overwhelming the patent
examiner with precautionary disclosure of prior art of marginal relevance.163
Finally, the current system burdens patent counsel, applicants, and
inventors. Collecting and reporting information requires significant
amounts of time from patent counsel, applicants, and inventors. This
burden is made more substantial in light of the extra care that must be
taken to avoid the potential drastic consequences resulting from misinterpretation of an innocent oversight as intentional misconduct. These
potential consequences include the invalidation of an entire patent
158. See infra Section IV.A.2.
159. MPEP, supra note 6, § 707.05 (“The examiner must consider all the prior art references . . . cited in the application or reexamination, including those cited by the applicant in a
properly submitted Information Disclosure Statement.”); see also id. at § 609.05(b) (“The
information contained in information disclosure statements which comply with both the content [and timing] requirements . . . will be considered by the examiner. Consideration by the
examiner . . . means that the examiner will consider the documents in the same manner as
other documents in Office search files are considered by the examiner while conducting a
search of the prior art in a proper field of search.”).
160. Dennis Crouch, Citing Patent References, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 10, 2013, 7:24 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/citingreferences.html.
161. Id.
162. Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do applicant patent
citations matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 844 (2013).
163. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, and Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288 (a patent is unenforceable if an inventor or person substantively involved in preparation or prosecution of the
patent fails to disclose to the U.S. PTO known information that is material to patentability of
any claim of the patent), with JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2 (after providing Applicant with both notice and an opportunity to disclose known prior art, a Japanese
examiner may reject an application, but a failure to disclose known prior art cannot be used
to invalidate a granted patent).
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family and the potential for reputational damage to the prosecuting patent counsel who are tarred with the accusation of inequitable conduct.
Thus, the current mandatory disclosure system imposes significant
burdens on the courts, examiners, patent counsel, applicants, and inventors. These burdens would be justified if balanced by appropriate benefits. However, I could identify no evidence that the significant burden is
outweighed by the arguably negligible value the inequitable conduct defense provides in protecting against fraudulent prosecution based on violation of disclosure requirements. The examination process may even
be hampered by excessive disclosure of a long but incomplete list of disclosed references as discussed further in the next section.164
2. Mandatory disclosure obligations and harsh compliance
penalties are not necessary to punish fraudulent intent
or to enable effective examination
Abandoning the mandatory disclosure obligation for publicly available information would improve the U.S. patent system.165 Alternate
disincentives to patent fraud already exist within the U.S. patent system
in the form of an unclean hands defense and post-grant review procedures. In addition, given modern electronic search tools for publicly
available information, it is unclear that disclosure of publicly available
information provides any substantial benefit to improving the quality of
patent examination.
The doctrine of unclean hands persists as its own distinct remedy
for cases of fraud on the courts or on the PTO.166 This doctrine provides,
for example, an equitable defense based on a false statement in the inventor’s oath or declaration.167 This oath thus provides some protection
against fraudulently obtained patents by permitting an accused infringer
an affirmative defense of unclean hands if a patent application is knowingly pursued in extreme cases of bad faith.168 The unclean hands defense does not provide 100% protection against fraudulently obtained
164. See van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 120, at 20.
165. The obligation to disclose non-public information, such as prior sales, is still warranted since the examiner will not have access to such information even if she is familiar with
the prior art.
166. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
167. See MPEP, supra note 6, at § 602.01(a). The inventor’s oath or declaration must
include a statement by each named inventor that “such individual believes himself or herself
to be the original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application.” Id. Limited exceptions exist, as described in more detail in MPEP, supra note 6, at §
602.01(a). Id.
168. See, e.g., Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1341-44 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (finding a patent unenforceable due to the inequitable conduct of submitting a false
declaration).
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patents, but neither does the inequitable conduct defense. As the inequitable conduct defense continues to be further clarified, as it was in Therasense, the rules can predictably be gamed by those true bad actors who
endeavor to become knowledgeable in patent law.169 For such actors,
the inequitable conduct defense may thus lose its deterrent effect.170
In addition to not providing a deterrent effect to knowledgeable bad
actors, the disclosure requirement may not help examiners thoroughly
review a patent application. The disclosure of a large number of prior
art references creates a selection bias in the materials to be reviewed by
examiners.171 If distracted by large numbers of references already reviewed by patent counsel while drafting the application, examiners may
fail to recognize a different perspective on the disclosed invention due
to selection bias and therefore fail to perform a fully independent search
that would identify art that is more closely related to the claimed invention.172 Since evaluation of an examiner’s job performance depends in
part on the number of applications examined within an evaluation period, an examiner effectively has a fixed amount of time to examine an
average application.173 That time averages only nineteen hours per application for review of the application, review of the prior art, drafting
of Office Actions, and review and evaluation of amendments from the
patent applicant.174 Since examiners are required to consider all disclosed information,175 an applicant may overload an examiner with hundreds of references and thus effectively apply time pressure to encourage
the examiner to limit her own independent search and thus to review an
application less thoroughly for novelty and obviousness.176 This effective reduction in time to review an application can result in a significantly higher grant rate due to improper allowance of patent applications.177 Additionally, prior art disclosed by the applicant and inventor
169. See Mark & Anenson, supra note 120, at 386.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 372-73 (“[A]pplicants often attempt to negate the [inequitable conduct]
defense by providing the PTO with voluminous prior art references—many of which are inconsequential or unavailing.”); see also id. at n.74 (“[P]atent applicants [attempt] to ‘bury’
examiners with hundreds of references so as to distract them from highly relevant references.”).
172. Id. at 386.
173. See, e.g., Josh Landau, Granted in 19 Hours, PATENT PROGRESS (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/03/06/granted-19-hours/.
174. Id.
175. See MPEP, supra note 6, at § 707.05.
176. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 120, at 20.
177. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review
Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from MicroLevel Application Data 17, 39 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20337, 2014),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20337 (finding that more experienced patent examiners
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may not include key technical references that would be more directly
related to patentability and that would be identified with a more thorough
search.178
Even if a patent is improperly issued, there are other mechanisms
in place that allow correction. Historically, supporters of the U.S. disclosure system noted that a key reason for requiring disclosure in the
United States but not in Europe was because Europe had a more efficient
and robust post-grant review process.179 Through these post-grant oppositions, the EPO improves patent quality by allowing third parties to introduce facts and arguments to attack patent validity.180 The AIA implemented a more accessible post-grant review process “in the likeness of
European oppositions.”181 Although there are notable differences between the two systems, the AIA post-grant review process further mitigates against improperly issued patents by adding an additional layer of
protection and providing “a faster, less expensive alternative to patent
litigation.”182
By thus evaluating the alternatives to the harsh inequitable conduct
defense and the mandatory disclosure rules, we can determine that these
rules are not required in order to have an effective and efficient patent
system. Many of the litigation benefits of the inequitable conduct can
be served by the inventor’s oath and the unclean hands defense. It is
unclear whether patent examiners benefit or are harmed by the disclosure
requirement because they must spend time reviewing the cited art, most
of which is only marginally relevant and not used in Office Actions. Finally, the AIA has enhanced the methods available for affected parties
to invalidate improperly granted patents. For these reasons, limiting the
mandatory disclosure obligation to non-publicly available information
or removing the harsh penalty associated with the inequitable conduct
defense would improve the U.S. patent system.

granted patent applications in 19% more cases than inexperienced examiners, or an increase
of nearly 28% relative to the rate for inexperienced examiners, and attributing nearly all of
this difference to a reduction in the time allocated for examination of applications by experienced examiners: “if all examiners were allocated as many hours as are extended to [inexperienced] examiners, the Patent Office’s overall grant rate would fall by roughly 14 percentage
points, or nearly 20 percent.”).
178. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 120, at 20.
179. See, e.g., Erstling, supra note 19, at 360-61.
180. De Corte et al., supra note 122, at 99.
181. Id. at 138.
182. Id. at 143 (noting that these benefits will occur despite notable differences between
the U.S. post-grant reviews and European oppositions).
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B. Disclosure requirements for inventors create significant burdens
and potential conflicts for corporate patent applicants following
termination of the employer-employee relationship
Even if mandatory disclosure of prior art would be beneficial, the
implementation in U.S. regulations creates undue burdens on corporate
patent applicants due to their focus on individuals, rather than the applicant. By enacting the AIA, Congress recognized that the true party-ininterest for a patent application is typically the corporation to which a
patent application has been assigned by employee-inventors.183 The AIA
allowed applicant-assignees certain rights in prosecuting patent applications as patent applicants.184 However, Congress did not modify the disclosure obligation for inventors.185 So, although an applicant (e.g., an
assignee corporation) may prosecute the patent application, it must rely
upon the inventor(s) to disclose known material information. Such an
obligation is reasonable if there is an agency relationship between the
applicant and the inventors, but it creates misaligned incentives if there
is no such relationship.
For example, consider an employee-inventor who is fired by or otherwise upset with a corporate patent applicant. Such a disgruntled inventor may feel little motivation to disclose prior art that she subsequently discovers. In extreme cases, devious inventors may even be
motivated to seek out and conceal material information. Fundamentally,
there is a significant misalignment of incentives. The corporate patentee
may subsequently rely heavily on the validity of a patent as it invests
millions of dollars in development and commercialization of a patented
invention based on the expectation of a patent monopoly. This patent
monopoly is a cornerstone of the bargain between the patentee and the
government and provides consideration in exchange for the applicant’s

183. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 21, at § 4(b)(1) at 296 (amending 35
U.S.C. § 118 to read, in part, “A person to whom the inventor has assigned or is under an
obligation to assign the invention may make an application for patent.”); see also MPEP, supra note 6, at § 605 (“Effective September 16, 2012, the Office revised the rules of practice
to permit a person to whom the inventor has assigned or is under an obligation to assign an
invention to file and prosecute an application for patent as the applicant, and to permit a person
who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter to file and prosecute an application for patent as the applicant on behalf of the inventor. . . . For [patent] applications
filed before September 16, 2012, a person to whom the inventor assigned an invention could
file and prosecute an application for patent, but the inventor is considered the applicant.”).
184. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 21, at § 4(b)(1) at 296.
185. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56(a), (c) (requiring disclosure of material information by inventors, among others).
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disclosure of a patentable invention.186 On the other hand, the inventor
who is now a former employee may receive no further compensation
from the corporation based on whether the patent issues. Furthermore,
the inventor may go to work for a competitor of the corporation and may
be under a confidentiality obligation not to disclose certain material data
that she discovers as the result of her new employment. Such confidential information may still be material information if, for example, it contradicts a statement on the record or disproves that an embodiment is
enabled. This misalignment of incentives and potential for conflicts creates a danger of invalidation of otherwise legitimate patents.
The courts have recognized the potential for such misaligned incentives in their development of the assignor estoppel doctrine. Assignor
estoppel prevents an assignee from challenging the validity of patents as
a defense to an infringement action against the assignee or against a party
in privity with assignee.187 The courts developed this doctrine to deny
an assignor the opportunity to obtain consideration in exchange for patent rights and subsequently allege that those patent rights have no value,
thus retaining the right to make and sell the claimed invention.188 Such
double dipping by assignor was viewed as a violation of the assignor’s
duty of fair dealing that is a fundamental aspect of contract law.189
Therefore, an inventor is estopped from presenting an invalidity defense
if she is sued for patent infringement subsequent to her patent assignment.190 So, an employee-inventor would likely be prevented from personally practicing a claimed invention that was invalidated because of
her misconduct.
The employee-inventor could, however, enable an inequitable conduct defense for a third party. Under the current system, an employeeinventor typically assigns title to a patented invention to her corporate
employer but she still may effectively control whether that patent has
any value based on her compliance with her disclosure obligation.191
186. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966) (“[T]he underlying policy of the patent system [is] that ‘the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,’ . . . must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent
monopoly.”) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in
VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H. Washington ed.)).
187. See Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
188. See id. at 1224; see generally Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924).
189. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 266 U.S. at 350 (“[F]air dealing should prevent [patent assignor] from derogating from the title he has assigned, just as it estops a grantor of a
deed of land from impeaching the effect of his solemn act as against his grantee.”).
190. Id.
191. See supra Section IV.B.
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This is analogous to permitting a car dealer to retain a self-destruct button for a car after the purchaser leaves the lot. Alternatively, in Judge
Rader’s vernacular, it is equivalent to allowing a former disgruntled employee to hold the nuclear button to an “atomic bomb” attached to a corporate patent.192 Thus, this misalignment of incentives unnecessarily introduces uncertainty surrounding enforceability, thereby reducing the
value of granted patents.
To limit intentional bad faith acts by former employees and to encourage compliance with the disclosure obligation, best practices require
employees to sign agreements that obligate them to provide additional
lawful assistance to fully realize the patent rights of their inventions and
these obligations typically persist despite termination of employment.193
However, the ability of a corporate applicant to pursue remedies for
breach of a contractual obligation with a former employee may be little
consolation when viewed relative to potential patent damages of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Thus, in addition to the general problems with the disclosure obligation as described in the previous section, the disclosure obligation as
expressed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) creates problems for corporate patent
applicants who no longer have an agency relationship with a former employee-inventor. This problem is not created in most other countries that
have a duty of disclosure because the focus of the duty is on the applicant
instead of the individual whereas the disclosure obligation for the United
States specifically identifies the inventor and other individuals.
V. PROPOSAL
The mandatory disclosure rules should be modified to remove the
requirement to disclose publicly available documents. Mandatory disclosure of such documents is an inefficient and ineffective means of promoting progress of science and the useful arts. Alternatively, if a disclosure obligation remains for publicly available documents, it should be
modified in two ways. First, the PTO should not require disclosure of
U.S. patents and published U.S. patent applications. Second, for patents
prosecuted by an employer-assignee, the mandatory disclosure obligation of the employee-inventor should be limited to the duration of the
inventor’s agency relationship with the corporate employer-assignee.
With these changes, the U.S. patent system will more effectively fulfill
192. Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., PRAC. L. LAB. & EMP. & PRAC. L. INTELL. PROP. & TECH., EMPLOYEE
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AGREEMENT § 2, Westlaw 6-501-1547,
https://www.westlaw.com/6-501-1547?view=hidealldraftingnotes&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
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its constitutional mandate “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”194
Even if the disclosure requirement were completely effective in
eliminating all fraud on the PTO, it is important to assess both the costs
and the benefits of the mandatory disclosure obligation. Means directed
to laudable goals may be pragmatically rejected if the costs outweigh the
benefits. The excessive burdens of disclosure noted by comments to IP
Australia are also applicable for the U.S. system.195 Just as the Australian Parliament chose to abandon its disclosure obligation because the
information it was requesting was publicly accessible,196 the United
States should abandon its disclosure requirement, at least to the extent
that it requires disclosure of publicly available references, such as published patent applications, patents, and technical journal articles. Examiners are well positioned to find such materials if provided with effective
modern search tools.197 Removal of the disclosure obligations for all
public information would result in savings for patentees due to reduced
hours spent by inventors and attorneys for identifying, tracking, and reporting prior art references. Preparing and filing invention disclosure
statements (“IDS”) can cost hundreds of dollars each.198 Additionally,
there may be significant time spent by inventors and others involved in
patent prosecution in collecting references to be reported to patent counsel. A portion or the entirety of the average amount saved could be directed to increased patent filing fees. Thus, the money that would otherwise be spent by applicants in preparing and filing disclosures could
be repurposed to provide examiners with (1) additional time for reviewing applications and performing more comprehensive searches, (2) improved search tools, and (3) broader access to technical publications.
If the goal of the disclosure requirement is higher quality patent
prosecution, the EPO’s experience is evidence that a mandatory
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
195. See Zuhn, supra note 136.
196. Erstling, supra note 19, at 353.
197. MPEP, supra note 6, at § 902.03(e) (“The automated search tools on examiners’
desktop computers include the Examiner’s Automated Search Tool (EAST), the Web-Based
Examiner Search Tool (WEST), and the Foreign Patent Access System (FPAS).”); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-479, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE
SHOULD STRENGTHEN SEARCH CAPABILITIES AND BETTER MONITOR EXAMINERS’ WORK 9,
44 (June 2016) (noting that despite providing access “to 119 different journals or external
databases[,] USPTO’s current search tools do not provide examiners with immediate access
to computer-generated translations” and does not have a documented strategy for examiners
to identify relevant nonpatent literature).
198. See, e.g., Brown & Michaels Budget Estimator for Patents, BROWN & MICHAELS,
PC, http://www.bpmlegal.com/patfees.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (quoting a price of
$350 simply for the preparation and submission of the IDS forms for up to a maximum of 20
references, not including any costs for review of the references or fees charged by the PTO).
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disclosure obligation is not required for high quality examination.199 As
demonstrated by the European model, such public references are efficiently identified by examiners during comprehensive searches when examiners are not pre-directed towards certain art by submissions from the
patent applicant.200 Hiring more examiners based on a higher patent application fee would also be helpful in improving patent quality.
If, on the other hand, the goal of mandatory disclosure is to prevent
fraudulent procurement of valid patents, it is unclear whether requiring
disclosure is sufficient to stop such abuse or an efficient means of doing
so. An inventor who would defraud the PTO by obtaining a patent with
claims that she knows are invalid would likely be willing to take the
extra step of defrauding the PTO by not disclosing an anticipatory patent
reference so long as she has a “roadmap” to do so.201
In addition to removing the requirement to disclose publicly available information, the disclosure obligation should be revised to focus on
employer-applicants and their current agents, rather than individuals.
An employee-inventor’s obligation to disclose should be modified to end
when the employee-inventor’s employment relationship ends. The persistent obligation to disclose material prior art for an employee-inventor
creates misaligned incentives and has the potential to put the fate of
small research corporations in the hands of disgruntled former employees.202 This limitation should focus on the relationship between the employee and the employer, as distinguished from the assignor and assignee. Ownership of a patent application is too easily transferred to a
parent or related corporate entity. So, it is more appropriate to maintain
the disclosure obligation for the duration of the employment of the employee-inventor relationship. The effect of this modification to the disclosure rule would be to reduce the misaligned incentives between the
corporate-assignee applicants and disgruntled former-employee inventors that exist under the current rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
The mandatory disclosure rules provided in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 and
the inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement serve the laudable
goal of reducing the fraudulent acquisition of enforceable patents. However, the costs of mandatory disclosure rules outweigh the incremental
benefits of the ends. Modifications are warranted to enhance fairness,
use societal resources more efficiently, and better promote progress in
199.
200.
201.
202.

See van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 120, at 20-21.
Id.
See Mark & Anenson, supra note 120.
See supra Section IV.B.
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science and the useful arts. This Note recommends that these goals are
best served by repealing the mandatory disclosure rules for publicly
available references. However, in recognition that this may be politically infeasible, alternatively, (1) the mandatory disclosure requirement
should exclude U.S. patents and published U.S. patent applications and
(2) for patent applications in which a corporate employer is the applicant
and its employees are the named inventors, disclosure should be required
only from the employer-applicant and its current agents (including employees), and not from former employees, even if those former employees are named inventors.

